

STAT

ST. LOUIS GLOBE-DEMOCRAT (MS)

14 February 1983

Soviets winning war of ideology, CIA says

By EDWARD W. O'BRIEN
The Globe-Democrat
Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON — "The bad guys are winning" in the battle between the Soviet Union and the United States to shape world public opinion in support of their policies, according to CIA Deputy Director John McMahon.

In trying to counter Moscow's \$3 billion-a-year campaign of propaganda and other "active measures," the United States is engaged in "gestures — and that is all they are, gestures," McMahon has told the House Intelligence Committee.

"We are hitting it (the Soviet drive) with a fly swatter when we ask the (U.S.) ambassador to do something," he said.

ALTHOUGH WASHINGTON seeks to broadcast its position through the Voice of America and other agencies, "we still do not have the organization to impact the European media . . . on the truth of INF (the intermediate-range missile force)," he said.

"In fact, we have trouble doing that diplomatically, let alone coming out to the people," he testified. "So we are behind the power curve in trying to counter that. Even though we are on the side of the angels, the bad guys are winning."

Closed-hearing testimony by McMahon and other CIA and FBI intelligence officials on the escalating worldwide Soviet drive was released recently.

An FBI judgment that Soviet manipulation has not had significant impact on U.S. decision makers was widely reported, but other parts of the 337-page volume were not.

McMAHON AND others testified in detail and put several declassified government studies in the hearing record.

Soviet actions "have a common

aim — to insinuate Soviet foreign policy views into foreign governmental, journalistic, business, labor, academic, and artistic opinion in a non-attributable fashion," a CIA study said.

The CIA called the Russian campaign "an offensive instrument" of foreign policy. The FBI labeled it "political warfare."

Soviet measures include manipulation or control of the media, disinformation, use of foreign communist parties and front organizations, clandestine radio broadcasting, economic and military activities and other political-influence operations, the CIA said.

The United States is always the primary target, the CIA said, with the Soviet using varied tactics and resources to discredit, weaken, or isolate the country.

"**SOVIET ACTIVE** measures are poorly understood and are infrequently countered systematically by Western and Third World governments," the CIA said. "As a result, the Soviets have been able to go about their large-scale active-measures effort quite freely, to the detriment of Western foreign policy interests."

"The Soviets are willing to accept the risk of considerable political embarrassment as a consequence of active-measures operations. They apparently believe that controversy caused by the exposure of active-measures operations in the past has had no significant adverse impact on Soviet foreign policy programs."

According to the testimony, major Soviet campaigns have been waged to block neutron bomb development, thwart NATO installation of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, discredit Afghan rebels, court Moslem countries of Africa and the Middle East, support liberation movements in Africa, encourage SALT and Western disarmament.

ARTICLES APPEARED
ON PAGE 21

NEWSWEEK
31 JANUARY 1983

ARMS CONTROL

Europe's Year of Protest

As a household name, Mient-Jan Faber hardly ranks with Yuri Andropov. Yet the congenial Dutch math teacher may represent almost as big a threat to Western defense plans as the Soviet boss. Blending patient organization with pressure politics, Faber's Interchurch Peace Council has largely blocked Holland's plan to deploy U.S. nuclear missiles. And as Europe's peace movement girds for a year of protest, the Dutch model serves as its inspiration. Across the Continent, today's activists come equipped with a newfound political sophistication and with the advantage of an audience already nervous about nukes. That combination has fired the peace movement with optimism. It now challenges NATO's nuclear game plan as none of the old street demonstrations ever did.

Throughout 1983, Europe faces a tide of antinuclear protest and politics. British women have camped beside the Greenham Common air base for months ready to block the first shipment of missiles—while the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is mustering as many as 100,000 volunteers to canvass British voters against nuclear weapons. Some 160 Belgian towns have already declared themselves "de-nuclearized," and peace agents will be lobbying Florennes, the country's presumed missile site, to join the list. West Germany's antinu-

clear Green Party stands a healthy chance of winning parliamentary representation in the March 6 elections, competing for seats with missile opponents among the establishment Social Democrats. As the NATO deployment nears, the demonstrations will grow more intense. Plans for an autumn campaign in West Germany include civil disobedience, passive resistance and blockading military bases. "Unrest will reign in the Federal Republic for weeks and weeks," promises Jo Leinen, a protest leader.

Moscow openly cheers on the Western peace movement, but antinuclear leaders insist that they can manage their protest without Soviet help—or any particular East-bloc bias. "We want once and for all to be rid of the specter of anti-Americanism that has hovered around us for so long," says Wolfgang Ludwig of West Germany's Greens. As a political party, the Greens are entitled to state campaign funds, and will spend \$380,000 of the money on peace events—including a February "war crimes" tribunal in Nuremberg that will condemn "mass-destruction weapons" in both East and West. Leaders of the May 15 peace demonstration in West Berlin's Olympic Stadium have sought contributions from a wide spectrum of sympathizers across Europe. Greece's culture minister, Melina Mercouri, has offered to organize a relay to deliver the Olympic flame from Athens to Berlin.

Unity: As an offshoot of his Interchurch Peace Council, Faber has organized the International Peace and Communications Center, which serves as a clearinghouse for antinuclear strategy. The center takes on a

range of modest projects, such as staffing the Italian "peace camp" at Corniso, the prospective missile site in southern Sicily; and it plays a major role helping the West German movement keep some semblance of unity. Faber himself, the best-known public figure in Holland after Queen Beatrix, already has his sights on loftier ideals. "In a sense, the issue of cruise missiles is probably over, so far as the Netherlands is concerned," he says. "It is time to be thinking of other steps, of ways to move from the divisions of Europe to a situation where all of us can live in security and peace together."

If that sounds like a call for European neutralism, Faber tries to avoid the label; as one assurance that he takes Western defense seriously, his council advocates improvements in Dutch conventional forces as an

CONTINUED

WASHINGTON TIME
18 JANUARY 1983

Soviet 'active measures' against U.S. detailed

DORIS O'DONNELL

Last July, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives held two days of secret hearings on "Soviet active measures," a program directed mainly against the United States.

Testimony was presented by John McMahon, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Edward J. O'Malley, assistant director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and former Russian KGB Maj. Stanislav A. Levchenko, who defected to the United States in 1979. He had been a Soviet journalist in Japan, where he actually was a spy as well as a ranking KGB officer.

The testimony was withheld from public dissemination until Dec. 9, when U.S. Rep. C. W. Bill Young of Florida held a press conference at the Rayburn House Building in Washington where Levchenko was introduced to the media.

"The purpose of the hearings was to examine the magnitude and the methods of the Soviet Union's 'active measures' aimed at reducing the credibility and effectiveness of the United States throughout the world," Young said.

The report, while not drawing conclusions, deals with some of the Soviet activities that include agents of influence, manipulation of groups and individuals, forgeries of documents, demonstrations, public demonstrations and media manipulation, Young said.

Young said the CIA and FBI witnesses presented studies of situations where Soviet "secret measures" were used, and they also reported on the Soviet funding of the European peace movement, Soviet political

influence operations, the Christian Peace Conference, the World Peace Council, and the use of journalists and journalism covers by Soviet intelligence.

Young said the "hearings would not have been as effective without Stanislav Levchenko, who at one time was a major in the Soviet KGB, involved in the 'active measures' program of the KGB. Maj. Levchenko is the only Soviet KGB official involved in 'active measures' who has ever defected to the United States," Young said.

Young also explained that the hearings were held prior to nuclear freeze activities in the United States, and "the freeze was not the purpose of the hearings."

John Stein, deputy director for operations of the CIA, explained to the committee, headed by Rep. Edward P. Boland, D-Mass., that "the Soviet term 'active measures' is used (primarily in an intelligence context) to distinguish influence operations from espionage and counterintelligence, but this term is not limited to intelligence alone."

"Rather, Soviet 'active measures' involve activities by virtually every element of the Soviet party and state structure and are regarded as valuable, a regular supplement to, and closely coordinated with traditional diplomacy," Stein said.

Stein said Soviet "active measures" include manipulation or control of the media; written or oral disinformation; use of foreign Communist parties and front organizations; clandestine radio broadcasting; economic activities; military operations

and other political influence operations.

The CIA report to the committee said the use of the Soviet terms "active measures," rather than the more familiar term covert action, is intentional. "Active measures" comprise a broader concept than covert action and include a full range of overt, as well as covert, activities undertaken by the Soviet Union.

The secret July hearings provided the CIA an opportunity to update its Intelligence Memorandum, last presented to the House intelligence committee in February of 1980.

McMahon told the committee "there is a tendency in the West to underestimate the significance of foreign propaganda and to cast doubt on the effectiveness of 'active measures' as instruments of foreign policy."

"Soviet leaders, however, do not share such beliefs," McMahon said. "They regard propaganda and 'active measures' as important supplemental instruments in the conduct of their foreign policy by conventional diplomatic military and economic means."

McMahon cited the "active measures" the Soviets undertook against the INF, the intermediate range nuclear forces, in Europe some years ago.

"That campaign," he said, "which began in 1979, continues unabated, and there is evidence that the Soviet Union is manipulating and financing activities by some elements of the so-called peace movement in Western Europe."

McMahon added that not all opposition to NATO nuclear-forces modernization is Soviet-inspired.

"Many people are sincerely concerned about the potential danger of nuclear weapons. We do have good evidence, however, that the Soviets have set out to exploit and manipulate the movement, and we believe that the Soviet covert support has enabled it to grow beyond its own capabilities."

"Ultimate approval for the use of 'active measures,'" McMahon said, "rests with the highest level of the Soviet hierarchy, the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The KGB implements most covert 'active measures' operations."

CONTINUED

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1

LOS ANGELES TIMES
3 JANUARY 1983

Rebuilding U.S. Intelligence

Casey Shapes Up CIA, Survives as Top Spy

By ROBERT C. TOTH, *Times Staff Writer*

WASHINGTON—Last summer, several months before Leonid I. Brezhnev died, the Central Intelligence Agency produced a study of Kremlin leadership politics almost 40 pages long. It predicted that a cluster of Soviet officials would succeed Brezhnev, not a strong individual leader.

After reviewing the top-secret report before it was forwarded to the White House, Central Intelligence Director William J. Casey concluded that President Reagan would never wade through it all. So, in a brief covering letter couched in race-track parlance, he boldly predicted which Kremlin contenders would win, place and show.

Kirilenko peaked too soon, Casey told Reagan, and Chernenko faded in the stretch. Andropov is in the lead, perhaps challenged by Ustinov, with Gorbachev the dark horse and a future corner.

On the Money

As it turned out, Casey was right on the money: it was Yuri V. Andropov, not a committee, that succeeded Brezhnev as general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. But the episode is less important as a measure of Casey the Kremlinologist than as a measure of Casey the CIA director and of the methods Casey has developed to run the multibillion-dollar-a-year U.S. intelligence community.

Casey—a scrappy, sometimes arrogant, bulky 69-year-old who retains a trace of his native New York accent—has surprised admirers and critics alike by surviving as the nation's top spy through the first two years of Reagan's tenure. Even more, he has managed to set and maintain a careful but significant pace for rebuilding the nation's intelligence capabilities.

Casey's midterm report card shows that:

—The country has experienced no known "intelligence failures" or "intelligence abuses" during his two years.

—Intelligence budgets, up 20%, have grown even faster than the Pentagon budget.

—Output of analytic studies has jumped a remarkable fivefold over the last years of the Jimmy Carter Administration.

—Covert activities have dropped somewhat in number, but individual operations have grown in size.

—And "intelligence guidelines," which are the do's and don'ts of the community, have been shortened drastically.

Casey's former deputy, retired Adm. Bobby R. Inman, believes Casey will be rated "very high" as a director of intelligence for "totally overhauling the process of making national intelligence estimates—sharply increasing their number, making them shorter and more focused on problems that policy-makers grapple with—plus winning the President's support for rebuilding the intelligence community."

'Substantially Better'

"Under Bill, things are substantially better than the public image suggests," Inman said in an interview.

Ray S. Cline, a former senior CIA official, has praised Casey for seeking to balance, with equally high priority, the need to provide accurate, in-depth analysis with the need to make it timely and useful in helping to answer the hard policy questions of government.

On the other hand, liberal critics such as Morton Halperin, director of the Center for National Security

Studies, believe Casey has "moved the CIA backward" in restricting the release of information and in resurrecting its covert action capabilities. And some conservatives, who asked not to be identified, complain that Casey has not shaken up the intelligence community as the Republican Party platform of 1980 promised a Reagan Administration would do.

Be that as it may, Casey—a veteran of American intelligence operations during World War II, a multimillionaire with an entrepreneurial bent and a former senior federal official in financial and economic areas—has no intention of leaving the job.

"I'm enjoying it," he said in an interview, "and we're making progress. I intend to stick with it."

Twelve months ago, it was far from obvious that Casey was either enjoying the job or was going to keep it long.

At that point, he was reeling from his early and almost disastrous decision to hire a fellow Reagan campaign worker, Max Hugel, as chief of the CIA's clandestine operations—a "very conspicuous mistake on my part," Casey later called it. Hugel quit after private financial irregularities were alleged in the press, but three senior Republican senators called for Casey's resignation.

The Senate Intelligence Committee re-examined Casey's financial background, too. It grudgingly con-

CONTINUED

STAT